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There are three essential sources of uncertainty in the patent system:
perceived uncertainty due to selective sampling (“statistical artefact
uncertainty”), inherent uncertainty, and strategic uncertainty. It is only the
strategic uncertainty source that should be of concern to reformers. With
respect to this source, uncertainty in the patent system is largely a function of
two variables: the degree of inherent abstraction associated with the patent,
and the degree to which the patent provides notice of its scope. The maximal
degree of uncertainty is observed in the category of abstract patents with poor
notice, a category dominated today by software patents. I offer a few principles
for validating patents in this category of maximal uncertainty.
INTRODUCTION
In August 2015 The Economist ran a leader arguing that the patent system is
broken.1 The core of the magazine’s argument is captured in these lines:
Patents are supposed to spread knowledge, by obliging holders to lay out
their innovation for all to see; they often fail, because patent-lawyers are
masters of obfuscation. Instead, the system has created a parasitic ecology
* William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University; Professor of
Law, Boston University School of Law, knhylton@bu.edu. This is a contribution to the
Boston University Law Review’s “Notice & Notice Failure in Intellectual Property Law”
Symposium, 96 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). I thank Ben Roin for his helpful
suggestions as symposium commentator for this contribution.
1 Time to Fix Patents, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/
leaders/21660522-ideas-fuel-economy-todays-patent-systems-are-rotten-way-rewardingthem-time-fix [https://perma.cc/V4BB-7BEF] (highlighting current problems with the patent
system and emphasizing the need for a more clear and simplistic approach).
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of trolls and defensive patent-holders, who aim to block innovation, or at
least to stand in its way unless they can grab a share of the spoils.2
This statement accurately reflects a critique of the patent system that has
gained standing in recent years.3 Masters of obfuscation create uncertainty that
leads to unpredictable patent rights, which in turn generate litigation. Trolls
and defensive patents have the perverse effect of reducing innovation
incentives.
The problem of notice in patent law, a much discussed problem of late, is a
version of the obfuscation problem.4 Patent lawyers, as masters of obfuscation,
have given us a system that fails miserably in providing notice regarding the
scope of patent rights. In other words, we have a property system in which
boundaries are unclear, and the lawyers working within the system do their
best to keep them as unclear as possible. If Bentham were raised from the
dead, presumably he would point to the patent system today, rather than the
system of property inheritance that he attacked in his time, as the source of
sustenance for a thoroughly parasitic branch of the legal industry.5

2

Id.
Economists Michele Boldrin and David Levine advocate the strongest anti-patent
position. See generally MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY (2008) (providing examples in copyright and patent law where property rights
hinder innovation and harm public welfare). Other critiques have focused on particular
inefficiencies in the patent system, such as the alleged tendency toward excessive property
fragmentation. See generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (arguing
that too many owners of intellectual property in biomedical research leads to an underuse of
resources). A third critique focuses on implementation problems in the patent system and
potential solutions. See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE:
HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008) (highlighting
the challenges of abstract patents and the problem of notice for abstract patents).
4 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 10 (listing “[f]uzzy or unpredictable
boundaries” and “access to boundary information” as “important deficiencies” in the
implementation of patent notice); see generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE
PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (addressing many problems
with the current patent system including notice, capacity of the Patent and Trademark
Office, and litigation abuse); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2006) (highlighting cases where general ambiguity
led to increased patent litigation in recent years, and problems for overlapping and
cumulative innovations); FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING
PATENT
NOTICE
AND
REMEDIES
WITH
COMPETITION
(2011),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligningpatent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HSX6-YFJF] (recognizing patent notice as current challenge to the patent
system during a series of hearings and workshops held by the Federal Trade Commission).
5 See GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 267 (1986).
3
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I want to step back from this critique and look generally at the question of
uncertainty in the patent system. Like all property rights, patent rights cannot
be perfectly certain or predictable. Any property right is uncertain because the
state may choose to eradicate it at anytime.6 In addition, there is the issue of
incremental or “static” uncertainty in determining the precise scope of a
property right.7
What are the sources of uncertainty in the patent system? Is it possible to
generate a framework for thinking about uncertainty in the patent system? I
argue that there are three essential sources of uncertainty in the patent system:
perceived uncertainty due to selective sampling (“statistical artefact
uncertainty”), inherent uncertainty, and strategic uncertainty. It is only the
strategic uncertainty source that should be of concern to reformers. With
respect to this source, uncertainty in the patent system is largely a function of
two variables: the degree of inherent abstraction associated with the patent, and
the degree to which the patent provides notice of its scope. The two variables
are not necessarily equivalent; it is possible for a patent to be abstract, and yet
to provide nearly perfect notice of its scope. The maximal degree of
uncertainty is observed in the category of abstract patents with poor notice, a
category dominated today by software patents.
I offer a few principles for validating patents in this category of maximal
uncertainty. I conclude that software patents that are based on business process
algorithms, such as financial hedging, or that optimize the consumer-firm
interface should be presumptively invalid. However, software patents with
important spillover benefits beyond the specific application market, such as
consumer safety enhancements, should not be presumptively invalid. Part I
below sets out a theoretical framework for assessing the welfare effects of
uncertainty in the patent system, distinguishing incremental or static
uncertainty from the dynamic uncertainty associated with the wholesale
abrogation of a right. Part II explores the concept of static uncertainty in patent
law, which is the main focus of this paper. Part III extends the analysis to
address dynamic uncertainty in patent law. A brief conclusion follows.

6

For a general discussion of uncertainty and legal rights, see BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM
LAW 77-94 (Liberty Fund 3d ed. 1991) (1961); Anthony D’Amato, Legal
Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1983); Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Predictability of
Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 427, 429-34 (1995); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976).
7 See Hylton, supra note 6, at 429-30 (distinguishing types of uncertainty associated with
law and defining static predictability as “refer[ring] to the ease with which the meaning of a
legal rule can be comprehended”). The scope of a property right can be affected by many
laws. For example, duty doctrines in trespass law help to determine the scope of property
rights. See Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1501, 1510-12 (2006) (“Some ‘no-duty’ rules in tort law are simply complements to
property rules.”).
AND THE
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STARTING POINTS

Before looking closely at the uncertainty problem, I should start with a
statement of my premise on the objective of the patent system. It is only within
some definition of the system’s objective that we can determine whether
uncertainty is socially harmful, how harmful uncertainty is likely to be, and
precisely what types of uncertainty should concern us. In our book on the
economics of intellectual property, Ron Cass and I emphasize that the
fundamental optimality condition for the scope of an intellectual property right
requires a balance between the static monopolization cost of exclusion and the
dynamic benefit from encouraging innovation. In short, the scope of an
intellectual property right ends where static and dynamic costs are roughly
equal at the margin.8 Static and dynamic costs are balanced when a slight
increase in the scope of the property right, resulting in a welfare loss from
monopolization of one dollar, also increases the social benefit from additional
innovation by at least one dollar. We are by no means the first to make this
point about the fundamental welfare tradeoff in determining the scope or
duration of an intellectual property right.9 What differentiates our work is a
sustained effort to apply this simple optimality condition explicitly as we
surveyed the major doctrines of intellectual property law.10
One immediate implication of the optimal scope rule is that the bald claim
that more patent protection leads to more innovation, and therefore enhances
social welfare, is false. One can increase patent protection beyond the point at
which static and dynamic costs are balanced, and once that happens additional
protection reduces social welfare, and may reduce innovation as well.11
Consider, for example, the nonobviousness requirement of patent law. One
8 RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE
WORLD OF IDEAS 44-47 (2013) (“Intellectual property rights, like other property rights, are
justified where—and only where—the costs of exclusion and related costs are outweighed
by the benefits attending additional creation or discovery and the benefits of better
management, promotion, and allocation of the property.”).
9 This tradeoff has been clear to economists since the earliest studies of the economics of
patenting. For an excellent survey of the economics and an application of the same
theoretical argument to specific patent law doctrines, see Robert P. Merges & Richard R.
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990), though
Merges and Nelson do not use the same terminology as Cass and Hylton and focus on
industry-specific differences. The tradeoff has been emphasized for a long time in the
antitrust literature. E.g., David S. Evans & Keith N. Hylton, The Lawful Acquisition and
Exercise of Monopoly Power and Its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust, 4
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 203, 204, 233-34 (2008) (discussing “the tradeoff between static
and dynamic efficiency”); J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in
Antitrust Law, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581, 600-07 (2009) (discussing dynamic and
static competition in the context of antitrust law and economics).
10 See generally CASS & HYLTON, supra note 8.
11 See, e.g., id. at 49-55 (describing the challenges of monopolization if patent protection
were broadened to include mathematical formulae).
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could arguably strengthen patent protection by abolishing this requirement.
The result would be more patents. However, getting rid of the nonobviousness
requirement would lead to many patents that involve “short-step” innovation;
applications of ideas that only trivially extend some existing technology. As
such patents multiply, so would the local monopolies associated with them,
resulting in numerous atomistic patent monopolies. Where those small
monopolies involve technologies that must be combined, the problem of
“successive monopoly” would arise,12 and the aggregate loss from
monopolization would far exceed the loss that would result from a single
monopoly that integrated all of the complementary technologies.13 Further,
short-step innovation patents would impose significant dynamic costs as they
choke off the rewards available to more substantial follow-on innovations.14 A
version of Gresham’s Law might be observed, with low quality patents driving
out high quality patents.15 The nonobviousness requirement in our patent
system functions to prevent the natural tendency for prospective patentees to
seek patents on short-step innovations. Such a strategy would not only be
privately optimal for a prospective patentee, but it would be optimal for a
government that adopts a mercantilist approach to global competition in
technology. Such a government would direct its patent-awarding authority to
give patents for short-step innovation. Unsurprisingly, commentators have
suggested that the government of China has adopted precisely such a
strategy.16 Short-step patents would be of little value within the U.S., where
they would be rejected by the domestic patent office. But incumbent domestic

12 See KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW
EVOLUTION 334-35 (2003) (“The successive monopoly model views vertical mergers as a
response to the large welfare losses that can result when two firms with monopoly power are
in a vertical relationship.”); Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58
J. POL. ECON. 347, 347-52 (1950) (outlining through mathematical principles the economic
consequences of vertical and horizontal integration).
13 The successive monopoly problem is the fundamental economic phenomenon
underlying the so-called tragedy of the anticommons. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 3,
at 699.
14 CASS & HYLTON, supra note 8, at 68 (“For example, a patent awarded to a device that
involves a mere reordering of elements of an existing device could effectively block a
follow-on inventor from obtaining a patent for a significantly innovative variation.”).
15 Id. (describing how the inherent hierarchy in scientific development leads inventors to
follow established paths rather than consider simpler but more fruitful solutions).
16 Patent Fiction: Intellectual Property in China, ECONOMIST (Dec. 13, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21636100-are-ambitiousbureaucrats-fomenting-or-feigning-innovation-patent-fiction [https://perma.cc/S5G4-J3XR]
(suggesting that the 12th Five-Year Plan and Chinese National Development Strategy are
drivers of the increase in patents in China, rather than a rise in innovative ideas). On the
surge of Chinese patent filings, see Paul Kedrosky, China Patent Surge, INFECTIOUS GREED
(Oct.
16,
2006),
http://paul.kedrosky.com/archives/2006/10/china_patent_su.html
[https://perma.cc/L285-TGHR] (comparing trends in patent filings in various countries).
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firms based and operating in an emerging technological market would find
such patents enormously useful—as a means of transferring wealth or
technology—as foreign technology firms enter their home market and attempt
to sell new technology or technological services there.
The optimal scope rule immediately suggests that empirical studies
demonstrating that patent strengthening is not correlated with greater
innovation are not generating findings that necessarily undermine the value of
a properly functioning patent system.17 Making patents easier to get, broader in
scope, or longer in duration, will not necessarily improve social welfare, and
may reduce the overall rate of innovation. The interesting question is not
whether increasing the degree of protection provided by patent law is always
socially desirable, but whether the existing set of protections is greater than or
less than the socially optimal level.
In spite of all that has been said about uncertainty, a patent is a property
right. Every property right has a monopolizing effect, even if only to a trivial
degree.18 If the government gives me a property right in an ideal location for a
department store—say, in the busiest part of town—then it has given me a
degree of monopoly power to the extent I can use the right to exclude
competitors from that same ideal location. However, a government might think
it optimal to protect my property right if it could be relatively sure that the
static monopolization cost to society is offset by investments I would make in
reliance on that right, which might enhance society’s welfare. Thus, in return
for having a property right in the location I have purchased, I may be willing to
make investments in my store that are beneficial to consumers; these would be
investments that I would not make if my property right were not secure. If any
rival could co-locate at my store and sell his own goods there, I might stop
making many investments necessary to supply the goods and services I offer
from my store. Thus, the same general condition that applies to intellectual
property rights appears to apply to all property rights.19 The key difference is
that the static cost of monopolization due to property in land tends to be trivial
for most tangible goods and products; a competing store down the street would
force me to cut my prices to the competitive level, thus driving the static cost
of geographically localized monopoly power to zero.20 An intellectual property
right such as a patent, by contrast, prevents a rival from offering an equivalent
substitute to my patented technology, and the static cost is comparatively high

17 See Josh Lerner, 150 Years of Patent Office Practice, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 112,
141-42 (2005) (urging researchers to focus on “how the nature of patent office practice
affects the innovation process”).
18 See Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 47, 49 (1982) (“The
essence of ownership is the general recognition that costs are to be borne if a person is to act
in certain ways.”).
19 CASS & HYLTON, supra note 8, at 28-31 (exploring static and dynamic effects of real
property rights to an apple orchard).
20 Id. at 29.
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since the marginal cost of supplying an idea is essentially zero and the
spillover benefit from information is substantial.21
In thinking about property rights, there are fundamentally two sources of
uncertainty. One is the dynamic uncertainty of a major alteration in the right,
such as its elimination or expropriation by the government.22 The government
might decide to take my property, or deny me an exclusive right in it, or a right
may become obsolete through changes in tastes or technology.23 This is not a
major source of worry for most U.S. citizens because the U.S. Constitution
protects property rights, though the protection is far from complete.24 The other
source of uncertainty is the static uncertainty of ascertaining the precise scope
of the right.25 Nuisance law, for example, works consistently with these static
uncertainty questions, because it is not always clear whether some activity that
a neighbor engages in can be enjoined, thus curtailing the neighbor’s property
rights, because the neighbor’s activity reduces my enjoyment of my own
property.26
The dynamic uncertainty connected to intellectual property, especially
patents and copyrights, is perhaps an order of magnitude greater than that
associated with traditional property rights in real and in most types of personal
property. Intellectual property rights have a shorter history than rights in real
property; hence, a legislature or court might view it as less disruptive of the
political order to terminate an intellectual property right in comparison to

21

Id. at 28-31 (explaining that monopolies are able to charge much more than the
competitive price and therefore the static cost of exclusion, or the foregone utilitarian social
benefit of providing a service at competitive prices, is likely to be high).
22 See Hylton, supra note 6, at 431 (defining dynamic uncertainty as “the degree to which
parties who understand the meaning of a rule today can be sure that meaning will remain
valid tomorrow”).
23 See id. at 431-32 (“[I]f the law is likely to be changed in the near future, to a form that
is unpredictable, then the current rule cannot be relied upon in the formation of long-term
contracts and plans. Similarly, if conditions change in a way that gives the law, as it is
framed today, a different meaning tomorrow, then it is unreliable as a basis for plans.”).
24 Rent control, for example, seems to affect a taking, but the Supreme Court has not held
that it generally violates the Constitution’s Takings Clause. See Pennell v. City of San Jose,
485 U.S. 1, 15 (1988) (“[W]e hold that it is premature to consider appellants’ claim
[regarding the rent control Ordinance] under the Takings Clause and we reject their facial
challenge to the Ordinance under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
25 See Hylton, supra note 6, at 429 (defining static uncertainty as “the ease with which
the meaning of a legal rule can be comprehended”).
26 On uncertainty and cost-benefit balancing in nuisance law, see Keith N. Hylton, The
Economics of Nuisance Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY
LAW 326, 326-40 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011) (explaining that because
“the core of nuisance doctrine involves balancing tests and limitations on scope that are not
easily understood on the basis of transaction cost theory,” economics has been slow to
provide a coherent account of nuisance doctrine).
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terminating a right in real property. Patents and copyrights in the U.S. are
recognized as property because of a clause in the U.S. Constitution that
recognizes these entitlements.27 An amendment to the Constitution, a difficult
but not impossible change, could eliminate patents and copyrights. Indeed, if
the case against patents stated by The Economist leader quoted at the start of
this paper is correct,28 then amending the Constitution to eliminate patents
would appear to be not only wise, but consistent with the original intent of the
constitutional framers. The intellectual property clause of the Constitution
states its purpose, unlike most other clauses of the Constitution, which is “To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”29 If patents are no longer
serving this purpose—or worse, obstructing this goal—then an amendment
eliminating patent rights would further the clause’s stated purpose.
The static uncertainty associated with intellectual property rights is the
familiar stuff we see in intellectual property litigation. The scope of a patent is
uncertain. For any given patent there is a spectrum of potentially infringing
innovations, ranging from exact and intentional copies that clearly infringe to
technologies that share only the same general function at the most abstract
level. Drawing the line at which the patent right ends is likely to be an
imprecise endeavor in most cases. One can provide a general rule for drawing
such a line—such as the optimality condition that the line should be drawn to
balance static costs against dynamic costs—but even then the precise point at
which the line should be drawn would remain unclear, and arbitrary to some
degree in many cases.
II.

STATIC UNCERTAINTY AND PATENTS

Static uncertainty is the focus of this essay, but it is difficult to understand
precisely what it means. Uncertainty is inherent in the patent system, as in any
system that requires fine distinctions to be drawn by the law. The negligence
test, which often requires fine distinctions, generates a great deal of
uncertainty.30 Moreover, the uncertainty created by negligence doctrine has led
to at least one famous call for its abolition by Guido Calabresi in 1970.31 But

27 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”).
28 See Time to Fix Patents, supra note 1; supra text accompanying note 2 (criticizing the
current state of patents as overrun by trolls and over-defensive patent holders, a situation
which actually slows innovation).
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
30 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 126-29 (1881) (describing the
difficulty of determining bright-line negligence rules when “[l]egal, like natural divisions,
however clear in their general outline, will be found on exact scrutiny to end in a penumbra
or debatable land”).
31 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1970).
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other than Calabresi, there have been few calls for abolishing the negligence
test. The calls for reform of the patent system, by contrast, have been frequent
and loud of late, leading to the question of why the patent system should be
regarded as different from the tort system in a way that requires deep reform.32
Static uncertainty in the patent system can be differentiated according to
source. I think there are three sources supporting the complaints of uncertainty:
statistical artefact, inherent uncertainty of the sort that I described previously,
and strategic uncertainty created by actors in the system to gain an advantage.
A.

Statistical Artefact Uncertainty

Some uncertainty in the patent system can be put down to statistical artefact.
By the term “statistical artefact,” I mean the exaggerated appearance of
systemic uncertainty resulting from patterns in the baseline sample from which
observations are drawn. In the patent litigation context, the baseline sample
from which observations are drawn consists of patent lawsuits. Observers who
study such lawsuits may find evidence consistent with increasing uncertainty
in the patent system, both in the amount of litigation and in the unpredictability
of the results. But this evidence may mislead in some respects.
The problem I am referring to is a familiar one. When you drive to work in
the morning, you are probably stunned by the number of poor drivers you
encounter on a daily basis—both people who drive too slow, and people who
drive too fast. But if you are a normal driver, one who drives within but
relatively close to the speed limit, you are very likely to encounter a
disproportionate percentage of drivers who are on the extremes. Everyone, it
seems, is a fool behind the wheel.
Bessen and Meurer describe the huge run-up in patent litigation over the last
two decades, attributing it the lack of “notice” in the patent system.33 However,
they also show that the problems of notice are not rampant throughout the
patent system. Chemical and pharmaceutical patent litigation appear to have
risen gradually in an almost lock-step relationship with the aggregate value of
patents.34 Patents in other fields, however, have generated litigation costs that
have far outpaced the aggregate value of patents, suggesting that the problem

32
See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Group of Interested Patent Law Professors at 9-10,
Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 20071280), 2008 WL 2967559, at *9-10 (“The loud call for reform from academics and
practitioners shows that concern is shared both by those whose interests lie in the broader
health of the patent system as well as by those immediately affected by this Court’s
decisions.”).
33 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 11-28 (citing the rise in patent litigation as an
effect of the decline in patent quality and “problematic boundaries associated with patents
that are vaguely worded, overly abstract, of uncertain scope, or that contain strategically
hidden claims”).
34 Id. at 15 fig.1.1.
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of uncertainty and notice have grown dramatically outside of the
pharmaceutical patents area.35
The drivers of this increase in litigation are surely worthy of careful study.
However, the timing of the run-up in litigation involving non-pharmaceutical
patents suggests that it is related to the introduction and rapid growth of
software patents. Non-pharmaceutical patent litigation started to escalate in the
mid-1990s, soon after the Federal Circuit began protecting software patents
and around the same time that internet-based businesses built on software
patents began to appear in great numbers. The rapid entry of new internet
businesses, producing a phenomenon known as the “dot-com bubble” in the
stock market, eventually faded, as many of the businesses failed.36 These
failures laid the seeds for the modern internet businesses that have become
familiar in today’s economy. Over all of this time, however, software patents
grew as a percentage of patents awarded. By 2011, more than half of new
patents awarded were for software inventions.37 Also by 2011, the number of
lawsuits involving software-related patents exceeded the number of patent
lawsuit filings not involving software-related patents.38
The uncertainty and notice problems suggested by the escalation in patent
litigation may be entirely due to the growth of software patents—that is, to a
change in the composition of the baseline sample from which observations are
drawn. The large increase in litigation over software patents likely had
feedback effects in the litigation process. As the Federal Circuit granted more
reliable protection to software patents, its change in viewpoint likely had an

35

Id. However, this evidence is partially contradicted by data showing that patent
litigation seems to track overall patents issued, and patents issued track GDP. See Brad
Pederson, Patent Litigation: Too Much as Compared to What?, IPWATCHDOG (July 8,
2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/07/08/patent-litigation-too-much-as-compared-towhat/id=42868/ [https://perma.cc/X5Y7-UPRU] (finding that “the number of patent
lawsuits filed in the US has stayed relatively constant as a percentage of patents issued” and
that “there is a strong and persistent relationship between patent activity and economic
activity”). Similar data are presented in a PricewaterhouseCoopers study. See
2014
PATENT
LITIGATION
STUDY
5
(2014),
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2014-patent-litigationstudy.pdf [https://perma.cc/GY4L-WMU9] (“2013 continued the trend of high correlation
(approximately 94% since 1991) between the numbers of patent cases filed and patents
granted by the USPTO.”).
36 See,
e.g., The Dot-Com Bubble Bursts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/24/opinion/the-dot-com-bubble-bursts.html
[https://perma.cc/DB7M-S8S3] (describing the rapid decline of the stock market as many
young technology businesses failed or struggled to survive).
37 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE
PATENT QUALITY 13 (2013), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/
GAO-12-465_Final_Report_on_Patent_Litigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/2M7E-KYRX].
38 Id. at 21 fig.5.
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effect on general patent law. Bessen and Meurer suggest that the Federal
Circuit’s recognition of software patentability distorted well-established patent
law on abstraction, but only with respect to software.39 As a general matter,
however, common law doctrines are inevitably shaped by the factual
circumstances to which they are applied.40 Distorting the doctrine in one
factual context creates a precedent that can be used to justify a similar
distortion in a different factual context. Many common law rules have been
overturned through the progressive application of an exception that began as a
specific and localized deviation from a general legal doctrine.41 Thus, it is
unlikely that the Federal Circuit’s expansion of software patentability had no
impact at all on the general perception of fundamental constraints on
patentability, such as abstraction and obviousness.42 The concept of
abstraction, a factor that has long weighed against a finding of patentability,43
was de-emphasized in the Federal Circuit’s case law governing software;44
otherwise, the explosion in software and business method patents would not
have been able to occur. As litigants saw that the Federal Circuit was softening
its stance on abstraction as a bar to patentability, they must have been
encouraged to litigate more often on all types of patents, software-related or
not.
The feedback effect I refer to need not have been a strong one to contribute
to the litigation timeline presented by Bessen and Meurer. With so many
software patents issued over the period of the litigation explosion, even a small
feedback effect would be consistent with the pattern observed in the data.
This view receives some tentative support from the post-Alice evidence on
litigation, though the evidence is preliminary. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International45 (“Alice”) invalidated a software patent on the ground that it
39 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 201-12 (arguing that the abstractness of software
makes it difficult to place limits on abstract claims in software patents).
40 See generally EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-3 (1949).
41 Perhaps the most famous example is Judge Cardozo’s opinion in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (overturning common law precedent because
“[p]recedents drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do not fit the conditions of travel
to-day”). The path leading to MacPherson is discussed in LEVI, supra note 40, at 10-27.
42 On feedback effects of the sort described here, see Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation,
121 YALE L.J. 470, 492 (2011) (“Every time the Federal Circuit moves the law, the PTO
will respond accordingly, becoming slightly more permissive in granting patents.”).
43 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010) (“[I]n order to receive the Patent Act’s
protection the claimed invention must . . . [be] fully and particularly described.”);
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972) (reversing the grant of a patent for an
algorithm that was “abstract and sweeping”); CASS & HYLTON, supra note 8, at 59 (“The
most important limiting doctrine governing process patents is the requirement that the
process lead to particular, useful result.”).
44 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 201-12 (“[T]he net effect of [the Federal
Circuit’s] changes is that there are few limits to abstract software patent claims.”).
45 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
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embodied an abstract idea, and the opinion’s language suggested that many
software patents would be invalidated under the same reasoning.46 The postAlice data show a 13 percent decline in patent litigation in 2014.47 The number
of patent infringement lawsuits filed in 2013 was 6,497.48 The number of
patent lawsuits filed in 2014 was 5,686.49 A probably more accurate source,
Lex Machina, reports a patent litigation decline in 2014 of twenty-one
percent,50 and even this is an understatement because the reduction should be
compared to the trend line established in previous years,51 and should hold
fixed for the number of defendants involved in litigation.52 Alice led to the
invalidation of more than 100 software patents and led many holders of
software patents to drop their plans to sue for infringement.53
Of course, this evidence is preliminary because more recent data for 2015
suggest an increase in patent litigation, though not enough to match the cases

46

Id. at 2358 (“[W]holly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of
‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that the process is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012))); see also Steven
Seidenberg, Business-Method and Software Patents May Go Through the Looking Glass
After Alice Decision, ABA J., Feb. 2015, at 1, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/business_method_and_software_patents_may_go_through_the_looking_glass_after
[https://perma.cc/JLY7-2L98] (reporting that after Alice, the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office was “striking down [software and business-method] patents in record numbers and
denying applications that would previously have been granted”).
47 Kevin A. Rieffel, Patent Litigation Study Should Cause Patent Reform Pause,
IPWATCHDOG (May 20, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/05/20/study-shouldpause-patent-reform/id=57946/ [https://perma.cc/A7SD-H756].
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 2014 Patent Litigation Statistics, MARATHON PAT. GROUP (May 29, 2015),
http://www.marathonpg.com/blog/detail/2248/2014-patent-litigation-statistics
[https://perma.cc/XFP2-9NKB].
51 Id. (observing that after factoring in the past trend of 12% litigation growth year over
year, “the change was actually 33%—the 12% the number of lawsuits didn’t rise as
expected based on past trends, plus the 21% the numbers dropped”).
52 Correcting for the number of defendants sued suggests that the decline in patent
litigation actually started in 2012. Holding fixed for the number of defendants sued, patent
litigation has been declining since the start of 2012. In fact, some suggest the rate of
decrease is actually accelerating. See Michael Renaud et al., No One Told John Oliver About
the America Invents Act: Last Week Tonight Stuck in 2012, MINTZ LEVIN (May 4, 2015),
http://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2015/Advisories/4920-0515-NAT-IP/ [https://perma.cc/
4FRN-KMTT] (“By this measure, it is clear that, since a peak in 2012, the volume of patent
litigation has decreased significantly. It also seems that the rate of decrease is
accelerating.”).
53 See Rieffel, supra note 47.
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that would exist if litigation had continued according to the pre-Alice trend.54
Much of this recent uptick might be due to Alice as well; and some patent
lawsuits are generated by the new mechanism of inter partes review at the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board, which is designed to facilitate patent
challenges. The overall effect of Alice on litigation rates will depend on the
behavior of patentees and potential infringers. The probability of a patentee
lawsuit in response to an infringement depends on the percentage of patentees
who perceive their patents as definitely dead under Alice versus the percentage
who think their patents may survive. The rate of infringement depends on the
percentage of potential licensees who no longer perceive a need to seek a
license in light of Alice. The litigation rate pattern from 2014 to 2015 could be
explained by a change in the percentage of patentees who believe they still
have valid patents, or by a change in the percentage of potential licensees who
perceive a need to seek a license, or by both factors. One simple explanation of
the pattern may be as follows. Suppose the percentage of patentees who view
their patents as valid dropped immediately after Alice, while the rate of
infringement remained fixed in the short run. Then suppose the rate of
infringement increased dramatically a few months after Alice as potential
licensees responded behaviorally to the implications of the decision. This
hypothesized set of reactions would generate a dip in patent litigation followed
by a bounce-back surge, as observed in the data.
Another factor generating the appearance of uncertainty is the lack of
systemic informational asymmetry in many areas of patent litigation, and
especially in software patents. If one side of litigation (plaintiff or defendant)
has a systemic informational advantage, plaintiff win rates will appear to be
biased in favor of the informed side.55 The reason is that a defendant who
knows that he is likely to lose under the legal standard will prefer to settle,
given an offer from the plaintiff that reflects the average probability of
winning, while the defendant who is convinced that he will win will prefer to
litigate rather than accept such a settlement.56 For example, doctors have a
systemic informational advantage over patients, and therefore innocent doctors
will tend to prefer to litigate rather than accept a settlement reflecting the
average likelihood of liability. Consequently medical malpractice litigation
tends to generate low win rates for plaintiffs.57 With a disproportionately large

54

For recent data on patent lawsuit filings, see Lisa Shuchman, New Data Shows Patent
Litigation
Filings
Up
in
2015,
CORP.
COUNSEL
(June
5,
2015),
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202728387530/New-Data-Shows-Patent-LitigationFilings-Up-in-2015A [https://perma.cc/3H9D-32H7]; 2014 Patent Litigation Statistics,
supra note 50 (suggesting Alice is one of two major causes for the drop in patent litigation).
55 Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 188 (1993) (“[W]in rate patterns can be explained by the
informational requirements of the relevant legal standard.”).
56 See id. at 189.
57 See id. at 206-10 tbls. A1, A2 & A3.
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percentage of innocent doctors in the sample of disputes litigated to judgment,
and forming the basis of appeals, the resulting appellate case law will appear to
favor doctors,58 and will also appear not to be plagued by uncertainty.59 To an
observer, it will all look rather simple: the doctor almost always wins.
However, in software patenting, it is unlikely that the patentee has any
information on the patentability of his invention that the alleged infringer does
not have as well. In such an environment, litigation will be driven by
idiosyncratic differences in information and errors in perception.60 As a result,
anyone who looks at a sample of litigated patent cases will probably find no
apparent pattern. It will all look so uncertain that it would appear to be
anybody’s guess who would win in a patent lawsuit. The finding that the
success rate for plaintiffs in patent litigation is roughly fifty percent is entirely
consistent with this conjecture.61 In addition, the data suggesting that patent
holder win rates have moved toward fifty percent over the 2000s is consistent
with a sample of cases increasingly consisting of software patents, which
generally confer no informational advantage on either side of the dispute.62
B.

Inherent Uncertainty

I have already referred to the inherent uncertainty associated with an optimal
patent system. I began by noting that an optimal patent system would balance
static and dynamic costs in determining the scope of a patent along any
dimension.63 For example, the optimal duration of a patent—whether ten,
58 For an analysis of data on win rates at trial and on appeal in medical malpractice and
other areas of litigation, see Michael Heise & Martin T. Wells, Revisiting Eisenberg and
Plaintiff Success: State Court Civil Trial and Appellate Outcomes 13 (Cornell Legal
Studies, Research Paper No. 15-24), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2638846 (“[W]hile plaintiffs’
success rate at trial was only 24 percent, those plaintiffs’ success rate on warding off an
appeal jumped to 67 percent.”).
59 See Hylton, supra note 55, at 189 (“[G]uilty defendants will be more likely to settle
than innocent defendants.”).
60 See id. at 204 (“Press reports and the liability literature . . . generally have reflected
frequently voiced concerns over doctrinal expansion and increased litigation in malpractice
and product liability even though these win rates have remained well below 50 percent. This
may be due to a general perception on the part of attorneys that the probability of success is
relatively high in these areas in spite of low win rates . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
61 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (“Of the 300 final validity decisions in
the data set, 162 (54%) found the patent valid, and 138 (46%) found the patent invalid.”
(footnote omitted)).
62 For a chart on patent holder win rates over time, see PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, A
CLOSER LOOK: 2008 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: DAMAGES AWARDS, SUCCESS RATES AND
TIME-TO-TRIAL 8, at chart 5A (2008), http://www.patenthawk.com/blog_docs/2007_
PWC_Patent_Trends.pdf [https://perma.cc/K85Q-NENB].
63 CASS & HYLTON, supra note 8, at 52-62 (noting that “patent doctrine appears to be
broadly consistent with the goal of minimizing static and dynamic costs”).
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twenty, or thirty years—is a matter of trading off static and dynamic costs.64 If
a patent system were to attempt to rigorously apply such a balancing test, it
would run into enormous difficulties in measuring static and dynamic costs.
Needless to say, courts do not explicitly apply the optimal scope test. However,
the legal tests that exist appear to have generated broad rules and categories of
patentability (e.g., excluding mathematical formulae) that are consistent with
the optimal scope rule.65 Of course, legal tests are hardly ever as precise or as
demanding of economic information as optimality rules in economics.66
Sometimes the legal tests provide vague guidance to courts in determining the
scope of patentability. The rules themselves create an unavoidable degree of
uncertainty and unpredictability in the patent litigation system.
Alice is an illustration of this inherent, interstitial uncertainty in patent law.
The rule from Alice asks courts to determine first if the software patent
embodies an abstract idea, such as hedging risk in financial markets.67 Second,
the test asks whether the inventor has added an “inventive concept” to the idea,
so that he is not merely using computer software to implement an abstract
concept.68 The combined test of abstraction-plus-inventive-concept offers
distressingly little guidance to courts on what to do with software patents.69
How is a judge to know what an inventive concept is, and how to identify one
that is sufficiently important to enforce a patent? The best that courts can do, it
seems, is use the facts of In re Bilski70 and Alice as precedents against which to
judge new patents. Still, Alice has had a large impact on perceptions of
certainty, largely because it initially generated a widespread fear that software
64

Id. at 75 (“Patent applicants naturally seek the broadest patent possible, which
necessitates doctrines that can reduce the scope of patents . . . where the expected costs of
protection exceed the expected social gains.”).
65 Id. at 52-72 (explaining that “the balance of static and dynamic costs appears to tile
against granting patent protection for mathematical results.”).
66 See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983)
(“[W]hile technical economic discussion helps to inform the antitrust laws, those laws
cannot precisely replicate the economists’ (sometimes conflicting) views. For, unlike
economics, law is an administrative system the effects of which depend upon the content of
rules and precedents only as they are applied by judges and juries in courts and by lawyers
advising their clients. Rules that seek to embody every economic complexity and
qualification may well, through the vagaries of administration, prove counter-productive,
undercutting the very economic ends they seek to serve.”).
67 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (“We must first
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible [overly abstract]
concept.”).
68 Id. at 2357 (stating that the second prong of the inquiry is whether the inventor added
an inventive concept that transforms the abstract idea into a patentable application).
69 Seidenberg, supra note 46 (stating that district courts are largely left up to their own
discretion in determining patent-eligibility).
70 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding a patent for software that implemented
industry-wide hedging calculations invalid).
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patents are no longer enforceable.71 Guidelines issued by the PTO also suggest
that most software processes should not be awarded patents.72 But the test of
Alice is too vague to support this general belief, and this is probably the reason
much litigation over software patents continues today.
The Federal Circuit appeared to have a much better grasp of the inherent
uncertainty problem than the Supreme Court. The Federal Circuit in Bilski
embraced a relatively clear, bright-line rule, the machine-or-transformation
test, which would have effectively eliminated most software patents.73 On
appeal, the Supreme Court rejected Bilski’s machine-or-transformation test and
instead relied on the abstraction test that was further developed in Alice.74 As a
general economic matter, the Supreme Court was correct to rely on the
abstraction doctrine to invalidate the software patents in Bilski and Alice. As
the degree of abstraction increases, the static monopolization costs associated
with a patent increase too, and the dynamic gains from spurring invention can
be overwhelmed by the discouragement of follow-on innovation.75 However,
the abstraction test of Alice has not been stated with sufficient clarity to serve
as useful guidance in software patent litigation. Recall that by 2011, nearly half
of new patents issued were for software-related innovation. The stock of
commercially valuable patents may, at this moment, consist largely of software
patents, many of questionable value after Alice. Moreover, many of these
patents have value largely as preemptive forces in the marketplace, as a means
of threatening competitors with lawsuits when they adopt software solutions to
common, industry-specific business problems. The holders of these patents
have enormous incentives to preserve their value, and therefore to litigate until
the boundaries created by Alice have been clarified.
Indeed, as Robert Merges suggested in a blog post, Google’s page-ranking
process, a key part of its initial success, was awarded a software patent in 2001

71 See Seidenberg, supra note 46 (“In almost every case since Alice in which a party
asserted that such patents consisted of ineligible subject matter, the courts have concurred
and struck down the patent.”).
72 Ryan Davis, USPTO Patent Guidance Has Attys Fearing Wave of Rejections, LAW360
(July 31, 2015, 9:13 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/685962/uspto-patent-guidancehas-attys-fearing-wave-of-rejections [https://perma.cc/E96K-EM8G] (“The way the
[guidance] categories are framed is so broad that it appears to be an invitation to examiners
to reject many potential inventions as abstract ideas . . . .”).
73 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954 (“A claimed process involving a fundamental principle that
uses a particular machine or apparatus would not pre-empt uses of the principle that do not
also use the specified machine or apparatus in the manner claimed. And a claimed process
that transforms a particular article to a specified different state or thing by applying a
fundamental principle would not pre-empt the use of the principle to transform any other
article, to transform the same article but in a manner not covered by the claim, or to do
anything other than transform the specified article.”).
74 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010).
75 CASS & HYLTON, supra note 8, at 52-62.
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(the “PageRank patent”),76 which may be questionable today under Alice.77 An
algorithm for optimizing search by ranking web pages is just a mathematical
algorithm performed on data. The notion of search optimization through a
ranking system is certainly an abstract idea. These factors suggest that the
PageRank patent is invalid under Alice. However, the case in favor of Google’s
patent is that it is not a general algorithm such as hedging, and it produces a
specific machine—the Google search process. But this justification is itself
questionable because the “search machine” is just the software process that
implements the algorithm.78 In any event, other large businesses may also have
such patents sitting at their foundations. This is quite a substantial force with
incentives to push against an interpretation of Alice that would eradicate
business-related software patents.
C.

Strategic Uncertainty

Perhaps the most important source of static uncertainty in patent law is
strategic, resulting from the strategic actions of participants in the patent
system.79 Within this category of uncertainty, the conduct of patentees appears
to loom largest. Patent applicants, working with patent lawyers, frame their
patent claims in a deliberately vague fashion in order to capture as much of the
foreseeable and unforeseeable related innovation that might arise within the
duration of the patent.80 Vague and abstract wording of claims broadens the net
of captured innovation, and also obstruct the efforts of others to find designarounds of the patent.
This is a natural tendency within any patent system; the self-interest of
patent applicants will always lead them to push for the broadest scope of
claims that can be defended. Because of this incentive, the most important
function of the courts is to provide doctrines limiting the scope of patents,
which the courts have done, most prominently with the abstraction doctrine

76

U.S. Patent No. 6,285,999 (issued Sept. 4, 2001).
Robert Merges, Symposium: Go ask Alice—What Can You Patent After Alice v. CLS
Bank?, SCOTUSBLOG, (June 20, 2014, 12:04 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/
06/symposium-go-ask-alice-what-can-you-patent-after-alice-v-cls-bank/ [https://perma.cc/
NL2Q-RWEH] (“The Page patent claims what is known as the page rank algorithm: a way
of weighting web pages by the density of links to them. . . . If a court were to become
convinced that the Page patent claimed the abstract idea of ‘weighting,’ it might be
invalid.”).
78 But this may not matter because Google probably relies more on the secrecy of its
search optimization methods than on the protection provided by the 2001 patent.
79 Bessen and Meurer make much of this source of uncertainty in explaining the great
increase in patent litigation over the last two decades. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3,
at 147-64.
80 Cf. id. at 153 (“[T]he clear boundaries provided by patents on chemical structures and
compositions explain the overall superior performance of the patent system in these
industries.” (emphasis added)).
77
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relied on in Alice.81 Moreover, the incentive to broaden the scope of patent
claims has existed for a long time—long before the recent explosion of patent
litigation.82 The patent administrative process could be reformed to limit the
use of this strategy on the part of patent applicants.83 However, the courts
provide a useful check, indeed the most important check, independent of the
administrative process. The Supreme Court recently limited the potential for
drafters to assert the most expansive claims by demanding notice with
reasonable certainty in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,84 overturning
an earlier rule that required only that claims not be “insolubly ambiguous.”85
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC86 represents
yet another recent step toward improving the incentives of claim drafters,
though there is still much more that can be done.87
The label “notice” offers a useful category for thinking about strategic
uncertainty. Notice suggests an effort to signal, and in this context it is the
signaling of patent boundaries that matters. Abstraction is another useful
category concept. Abstraction is a more primitive feature that refers to the
nature of the patent claim. A claim to patent a purely mathematical relationship
is inherently abstract because it covers all uses of the relationship regardless of
the precise form of its embodiment in some technology. Thus a patent can
differ along the dimensions of notice and abstraction, generating the
combinations of: (1) abstract with notice, (2) abstract without notice, (3) not
abstract with notice, and (4) not abstract without notice.
Consider the first combination, abstract with notice. What is an example of
such a patent? The patent in Bilski seems to be a perfect example: a patent for

81 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (stating one
policy rationale of limiting the scope of patent law, through rules against abstraction, as a
concern for preserving further discovery and invention).
82 ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG TO
GATES 258-59 (2009) (“Since the 1730s, applicants had to submit ‘specifications’ of their
inventions. . . . But patent specifications often concealed as much as they conveyed. . . .
[T]here was a distinct art to composing a patent specifications so as to reveal just enough to
sustain the claim and identify the invention, but not so much as to make the claim overly
specific or to enable others to replicate it.” (emphasis added)).
83 Bessen and Meurer propose changes in the patent administrative system to limit the
ability of patent applicants to expand the scope of their claims. See BESSEN & MEURER,
supra note 3, at 244-47.
84 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) (“[A] patent must be precise enough to afford clear
notice of what is claimed.”).
85 Id. at 2124.
86 792 F.3d 1339, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[I]f a person of ordinary skill in the art would
be unable to recognize the structure in the specification and associate it with the
corresponding function in the claim, a means-plus-function clause is indefinite [and
therefore the patent is invalid].”).
87 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 24-27 (outlining reforms to improve notice).
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hedging risk in energy markets.88 The patent probably did not suffer from a
lack of notice. Anyone in the relevant industry who used a computer program
to hedge risk in energy markets would have been able to determine that he may
have infringed the patent in Bilski. The reason for rejecting the patent in Bilski
was the problem of abstraction, that it preempted a vast set of applications that
had been carried on by businesses for a long time.89 The static monopolization
cost of enforcing the patent in Bilski was potentially enormous, and almost
surely in excess of any gains in spurring the particular innovation, which
would have occurred anyway from the desire and need to gain efficiency in a
routine business endeavor. Market competition alone would push businesses to
adopt hedging strategies and to use computer programs to help them
implement those strategies.
Next, consider the second combination, abstract without notice. Bessen and
Meurer offer fine illustrations of this problem in their discussions of the
E-Data and Blackberry-RIM disputes.90 The E-Data example involved vague,
nearly unintelligible patent claims, later interpreted expansively to cover not
only the electronic production of digital music recordings, its original intended
scope, but also general online commercial transactions.91 One recent example
in the courts involves a series of infringement lawsuits launched by EMG
Technology, LLC, all filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas, against several large firms for infringing its 2003 patents for navigating
websites on a cellphone.92 Perhaps in 2003 the concept of navigating a website

88

Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 599 (2010) (deciding patentability of “a claimed
invention that explains how buyers and sellers of commodities in the energy market can
protect, or hedge, against the risk of price changes”).
89 Id. at 612 (finding that “[t]he patent application here can be rejected under our
precedents on the unpatentability of abstract ideas,” and that “[t]hese claims attempt to
patent the use of the abstract idea of hedging risk in the energy market and then instruct the
use of well-known random analysis techniques to help establish some of the inputs into the
equation”).
90 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 8-9 (“The boundaries of the E-Data patent depend
on the meaning of abstract phrases.”); id. at 48-50 (suggesting that for Blackberry-RIM,
“[t]he costs of sorting through a large number of uncertain property rights is larger than the
expected cost incurred when any one patent is asserted against the innovator”).
91 In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit defined the patent at issue
broadly by, for instance, defining point of sale location as any location with an Internet
connection. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 9.
92 Complaint, EMG Tech., LLC v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 6:15-cv-00498
(E.D. Tex. filed May 27, 2015); Complaint, EMG Tech., LLC v. Dillard’s, Inc., No. 6:15cv-00499 (E.D. Tex. filed May 27, 2015); Complaint, EMG Tech., LLC v. Dollar Gen.
Corp., No. 6:15-cv-00500 (E.D. Tex. filed May 27, 2015); Complaint, EMG Technology,
LLC v. Dollar Thrifty Auto. Grp., Inc., No. 6:15-cv-00501 (E.D. Tex. filed May 27, 2015);
Complaint, EMG Tech., LLC v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No. 6:15-cv-00502 (E.D. Tex.
filed May 27, 2015); Complaint, EMG Tech., LLC v. GameStop Corp., No. 6:15-cv-00503
(E.D. Tex. filed May 27, 2015); Complaint, EMG Tech., LLC v. Hallmark.com, LLC, No.

1136

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1117

on a cellphone may have seemed less than obvious or fully anticipated in
practice. The defendants noted that the patent involved little more than a
decision tree for guiding a computer program.93
These cases are distinguishable from Bilski in the sense that the abstract
concept in Bilski is well known and was in practice for centuries in financial
markets before the patent at issue was sought. The only innovation involved
implementing a financial hedging algorithm through a computer program. The
cases in the “abstract without notice” category, by contrast, involve rather
general conceptual functions. EMG Technology’s patent for navigating a
website from a mobile device sought to capture a property right in a routine
conceptual function—website navigation from a mobile device—that would
soon dominate electronic commerce. The E-Data patent covered “reproducing
information” at “point of sale location,” a conceptual function that would
appear to encompass all of online commercial activity.94
The third category, not abstract and with notice, consists of the sorts of
inventions that have been associated with the patent system since its inception.
Abraham Lincoln was granted a patent for a mechanism for lifting a boat over
shoals.95 This was at a time when patent applicants were required to present a
model of the invention.96 The prototype, still in existence, disproves any
assertion that the invention was abstract in nature, and its utility was obvious.
Still, the invention did not meet commercial success, failing to liberate Lincoln
from his occupation as a lawyer with public service aspirations.
One could argue that the Lincoln patent was also a conceptual-functions
patent, as I have used the term. The concept was to prevent a boat from being
trapped by a sand bar, which was a serious danger in Lincoln’s day. The waters
near Bermuda are littered with sunken ships caught by the numerous shoals
and coral reefs surrounding the island. The difference between the traditional
patent of Lincoln’s and the modern patents for functions such as web
navigation is the implementation through software. Software patents, all
essentially algorithms, inherently generate questions of scope that are not
6:15-cv-00504 (E.D. Tex. filed May 27, 2015); Complaint, EMG Tech., LLC v. Pier 1
Imps., Inc., No. 6:15-cv-00505 (E.D. Tex. filed May 27, 2015).
93 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 10-11, EMG Tech., LLC v. Dollar Gen. Corp., No.
6:15-cv-00500 (E.D. Tex. filed Aug. 11, 2015) (“The Asserted Patents thus amount to
nothing more than claims covering a visual phone tree or a Choose-Your-Own-Adventure
novel—that is, a simple decision tree. . . . Nothing contained in any claim elevates these
patents beyond the abstract ideas that have been practiced by hand in various forms for
decades.”).
94 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 8-9.
95 U.S. Patent No. 6,469 (issued May 22, 1849).
96 See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 66 (“In the past, inventors had to
demonstrate a working prototype or scale model of the invention in order to demonstrate
possession.”). Models were required of patent applicants until 1880. E.g., Kendall J. Dood,
Patent Models and the Patent Law: 1790-1880 (Part II—Conclusion), 65 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y
234, 271 (1983).
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generated by physical machines or processes. Because of this, I will aim my
remarks on the problems associated with conceptual-functions patents at
software patents.
The fourth category, not abstract without notice, can exist only in special
scenarios. The classic submarine patent might fall in this category.97 The
submarine patent begins as a vague application that morphs over time into
specific claims issued, covering technologies actually on the market. Once the
patent issues, the patentee seeks royalties from existing firms. Alternatively, in
a patent system that simply fails to record patents awarded or currently in
force, there could be non-abstract patents in existence whose records proving
current validity cannot be found, and therefore fail to provide notice. The
submarine patent problem has been reduced in importance by recent
legislation, though it has been a prominent failure of the U.S. patent system for
many years.
The most important source of strategic uncertainty in the patent system
today comes from the conceptual-functions software patents that now dominate
the “abstract without notice” category. While Bilski-like patents—algorithms
implemented with software—are troubling, they do not pose the same threats
to innovation as conceptual-functions patents. Bilski-like patents merely seek
to appropriate the efficiency gains from computing software. These gains are
significant, but their appropriation is unlikely to hinder innovation in the
techniques reduced to computing. For example, the development of new
hedging algorithms is unlikely to be discouraged by enforcing algorithmic
patents of the sort in Bilski. Specialists in mathematical finance, doing basic
research on optimization methods in financial markets, probably would have
similar incentives to discover more efficient hedging algorithms irrespective of
the ultimate patentability of computer programs implementing those
algorithms. Conceptual-functions patents, by contrast, threaten to appropriate
gains from innovation in business and operational methods. If EMG
Technology can enforce its patents for website navigation, it will put itself in a
position to tax firms that take advantage of a new forum for commerce—online
search and purchase from mobile devices—which it did virtually nothing to
help create. The gains from trade would be reduced by this tax, reducing the
size of the market for online transactions. The gains that should go to
consumers and businesses for exploiting new business and operational methods
made available by information technology would be siphoned off to the
holders of these patents.98

97 See generally Steve Blount, The Use of Delaying Tactics to Obtain Submarine Patents
and Amend Around a Patent that a Competitor Has Designed Around, 81 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 11, 13-17 (1999) (providing background on the submarine patent
problem).
98 EMG Technology is not the only firm attempting to enforce a conceptual-functions
software patent that appropriates gains from innovation in operational and business
methods. Here are four prominent and similar cases:
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Alice is not, at present, an adequate legal framework for conceptualfunctions software patents. The doctrinal test of Alice is too vague to provide
much guidance in this area. The factual precedents provided by Alice and
Bilski are narrow and do not involve conceptual-functions patents. Alice should
be understood to set up a presumption of invalidity for business or financial
(1) Data management and storage: Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC had its patents on data
management and storage held invalid under Alice, with defendants’ lawyers noting that
Evolutionary Intelligence’s patents covered a process similar to that of looking for books on
a topic at the library, or going through the books’ checkout history to see whether they had
been checked out frequently. See Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No.
13-04513, 2015 WL 5829783 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2015) (dismissing cases against Yelp, Inc.,
Facebook, Inc., Foursquare Labs, Inc., LivingSocial, Inc., Twitter, Inc., Groupon, Inc.,
Apple, Inc., Millennial Media, Inc., and Sprint Nextel Corp.); Daniel Langhorne, Apple,
Facebook Beat Data Processing, Storage Patent Suits, LAW360 (Oct. 7, 2015, 10:42 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/712337/apple-facebook-beat-data-processing-storagepatent-suits [https://perma.cc/P5T7-BP6D] (“A California federal judge on Tuesday
dismissed [Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC’s] patent infringement claims . . . holding the
plaintiff’s two disputed patents claimed abstract ideas regarding data management that are
non-patentable.”).
(2) Video on demand: A federal court in Hawaii invalidated Broadband iTV’s patents
covering video-on-demand technology. Broadband iTV, Inc. v. Oceanic Time Warner
Cable, LLC, Civ. No. 15-00131, 2015 WL 5768943, at *17 (D. Haw. Sept. 29, 2015) (“[I]t
nonetheless appears that the ‘336 Patent claims an abstract idea without sufficient inventive
concept under Alice. It is therefore ineligible for patenting under Section 101, and invalid
for enforcement against TWC.”); Vin Gurrieri, TWC, Hawaiian Telecom Get On-Demand
(Oct.
1,
2015,
6:56
PM),
Patent
Nixed
By
Alice,
LAW360
http://www.law360.com/articles/709803/twc-hawaiian-telecom-get-on-demand-patentnixed-by-alice [https://perma.cc/EFS3-AMYQ] (“The judge noted in both orders that
Broadband iTV offered no suggestion of what the patent does claim if not an abstract idea
and said that the patent was essentially aimed at automating a process that, in an earlier
time, was done manually.”).
(3) Video and music streaming: Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC had its patent for browsing
and streaming digital media invalidated, because it involved an abstract idea. Affinity Labs
of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. W-15-CV-029, 2015 WL 3757497, at *8, *15
(W.D. Tex. June 12, 2015) (finding that the patent failed to do more than use a computer to
implement an abstract idea); Gail Sullivan, Amazon Shuts Down Patent Suit Over Music
(Sept.
24,
2015,
12:58
PM),
Store,
App,
LAW360
http://www.law360.com/articles/706619/amazon-shuts-down-patent-suit-over-music-storeapp [https://perma.cc/FZ58-2P9L].
(4) Web shopping carts: eDekka LLC had its web shopping cart patent invalidated, after
suing numerous businesses, because it claimed only abstract ideas. eDekka LLC v.
3Balls.com, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-541, 2015 WL 5579840, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2015)
(“The Court finds that no inventive concept exists to transform the claimed abstract idea into
a patent-eligible concept.”); Matthew Bultman, EDekka Shopping Cart Patent Knocked Out
(Sept.
23,
2015,
7:37
PM),
Under
Alice,
LAW360
http://www.law360.com/articles/706282/edekka-shopping-cart-patent-knocked-out-underalice [https://perma.cc/55YY-BHBM].
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algorithms reduced to computer programs.99 One recent proposed application
of Alice to an algorithm for gambling on horse races should start with a
presumption of invalidity under this view.100 Again, algorithmic patents
involve efforts to appropriate the gains from software or information
technology generally. They are unlikely to be necessary to spur, or even
important in encouraging, innovation on the level of optimizing algorithms;
every gambling house has an incentive to find optimal methods of exploiting
punters.101
99

As another example of algorithmic patenting that should fall under the scope of Alice,
consider auctions. Matthew Bultman, Jewelry Channel Gets Rival’s Auction Patent Axed
(Oct.
20,
2015,
5:10
PM),
Under
Alice,
LAW360
http://www.law360.com/articles/716392/jewelry-channel-gets-rival-s-auction-patent-axedunder-alice [https://perma.cc/4S6C-ZTEU] (“The Patent Trial and Appeal Board has
invalidated an auction patent that Jewelry Television had sued rival network, The Jewelry
Channel Inc. USA, for infringing, finding the patent claimed only an abstract idea and thus
making it invalid under the U.S. Supreme Court’s Alice decision. . . . It rejected Jewelry
Television’s argument that it added the ‘inventive concept’ of using certain indicators to
reduce the quantity of a product before a sale, making it patent eligible.”).
100 See Complaint at 1-2, RaceTech, LLC v. Kentucky Downs, LLC, No. 1:15-cv-59
(W.D. Ky. Apr. 30, 2015); Jeff Zalesin, RaceTech Says Horse Race Betting Patents Survive
Alice, LAW360 (July 31, 2015, 3:07 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/685843/racetechsays-horse-race-betting-patents-survive-alice [https://perma.cc/SE72-X37S] (“Gambling
machine maker RaceTech LLC told a Kentucky federal judge on Thursday that horse racing
venue Kentucky Downs LLC and a rival gambling technology company can’t invalidate its
historical racing patents, arguing that a patent examiner already approved the claims under
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Alice decision.”).
101 A set of similar patent claims involves web-based promotional sweepstakes, often
connected with online gaming:
(1) Distributing promotional benefits to online gamers: Inventor Holdings, LLC had its
patent for distributing promotions invalidated as abstract. Inventor Holdings, LLC v.
Gameloft, Inc., C.A. No. 14-1067, 2015 WL 5769220, at *12 (D. Del. Sept. 20, 2015)
(dismissing cases against Gameloft, Inc., GLU Mobile Inc., King.com Ltd., NGMOCO,
LLC, Rovio Animation Company, and Supercell, Inc. because the ‘198 patent for
distributing promotions is directed towards patent-ineligible subject matter); see Vin
Gurrieri, ‘Candy Crush,’ ‘Angry Birds’ Makers Get Patent Nixed By Alice, LAW360 (Sept.
30, 2015, 8:40 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/709397/candy-crush-angry-birdsmakers-get-patent-nixed-by-alice [https://perma.cc/4H3W-E8EM] (“Judge Stark agreed
with the defendants that the ‘198 patent describes a way of using codes to unlock benefits in
a mobile game, which the judge said is just an abstract idea that cannot be patented under
Alice.”).
(2) Sweepstakes prizes for online gamers: Everglades Game Technologies, LLC’s patent
covering a method “to give sponsors ‘total control over game piece distribution and price
awards,’ primarily through the use of computer technology” in “collect-and-win” or “matchand-win” games was invalidated under Alice. Everglades Game Technologies, LLC v.
Supercell, Inc., No. 14-643-GMS, 2015 WL 4999654, at *1, *4 (D. Del. Aug. 21, 2015)
(“The court agrees with Supercell that each of the claims of the ‘050 Patent lack meaningful
limitations on the abstract idea.”).
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Another recent proposed application of Alice to a conceptual-functions
patent helps shed light on the problems in this area. The holder of a patent for a
test of driver impairment sued Mercedes for infringement, and the district court
held that the patent was invalid under Alice.102 The patentee, Kevin Roe, filed
an appeal to the Federal Circuit, arguing that his innovation includes several
inventive concepts and that his claims do not preempt the abstract idea of
testing driver impairment.103 The patentee also noted that his innovation was
an important, potentially life-saving technology.104
Stepping back, it does seem difficult on the most abstract level to distinguish
Roe’s patent from Lincoln’s. Both involve conceptual functions, the former
testing driver impairment and the latter preventing boats from being stranded
on shoals. Both are potentially life-saving, and hence have value beyond their
commercial measure. The difference is that one is software and the other is a
physical device. Why should Alice apply to one and not the other?
The short reason Alice is applicable to Roe’s patent and not to Lincoln’s (if
it were to be created fresh today) is that Roe’s, as a software patent, is
essentially an algorithm. As an algorithm, it creates the risk that it will preempt
new algorithms directed toward the same conceptual function. That is a
sufficient reason for finding Alice potentially applicable to Roe’s patent.
The danger presented by Alice is that it threatens to invalidate innovations
that could be enormously beneficial to society. A test for driver impairment
could significantly reduce the number of alcohol or sleep-related fatal
accidents on the roads. This is a significant problem, the solution to which
would yield spillover benefits for everyone, whether automobile drivers or
pedestrians.
Moreover, it is not clear that the market will always provide a sufficient
incentive for life-saving innovations such as the Lincoln patent or the Roe
patent (assuming the purported innovation is effective). A car maker might
find that it generates no additional sales from installing an enhanced driver
impairment testing mechanism, and that it gains little by advertising on this
matter. A private individual, however, may be encouraged by the rewards of
102

Vehicle Intelligence & Safety LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 78 F. Supp. 3d
884, 888-90 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“The claims in this case broadly relate to the concept of testing
operators of any kind of moving equipment for any kind of physical or mental impairment.
This concept qualifies as an abstract idea and . . . is not an inventive concept.”).
103 Vehicle Intelligence & Safety LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 2015-1411,
2015 WL 9461707, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 28, 2015) (“Vehicle Intelligence argues that its
methods are embedded in ‘specialized existing equipment modules,’ as opposed to generic
computers, which renders them patent-eligible.” (citation omitted)).
104 Id. at *5. In December 2015, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.
Id. The Federal Circuit, reviewing de novo, found that the claims are not limited to a
specific type of impairment, and do not explain how the impairment tests are performed or
how the “expert system” improves upon prior systems. Id. (“The claims merely state the
abstract idea of testing an equipment operator for impairments using an unspecified ‘expert
system’ running on equipment that already exists in various vehicles.”).
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the patent system to develop such a technology, and seek to make a profit by
promoting the technology to car-makers or to regulatory authorities. In
addition, a car manufacturer, if it had a sufficient incentive to develop such a
technology, would use it to gain an advantage in the market over rivals. The
individual inventor, in contrast, has no incentive to distort the market in favor
of one particular firm; his incentive is to license the innovation to all. These
arguments suggest that society should be reticent to adopt rules in the patent
system that deny patent law’s encouragement to certain safety-enhancing
innovations.
Important distinctions between web navigation patents and impairment
testing should be noted. Web navigation is one of many functions that every
business has an incentive to optimize for its customers, whether patents are
available or not. Competition will drive firms to adopt such functions. General
technologies that improve safety across an entire industry are not necessarily
functions that every business has an incentive to develop, a proposition
established in the law since Learned Hand’s opinion in The T.J. Hooper.105
Some of the victims of unsafe conditions may not be customers of the
industry—and the industry will have little incentive to devote resources to
reduce such external losses.106 The costs of developing a safety technology
may be high, the benefits may not be appropriable, and competition may not
reward such innovations.
This suggests at least one principle that should be adopted for conceptualfunctions patents: Conceptual-functions patents related to optimizing
consumer-firm interactions should be presumptively ineligible for patents.
Every business has an incentive to optimize its interactions with consumers—
to make its websites navigable by mobile devices, to order its messages to and
from consumers efficiently,107 to suggest alternative and higher priced goods or

105 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (recognizing that though many boats used radio
technology, it had not yet become an industry standard and the court was in no position to
demand that the rest of the industry conform).
106 Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 39 (1972)
(“Suppose the only benefit of a safety appliance is to a stranger to the industry in our earlier
sense—someone with whom the enterprise has no contractual relationship and will not enter
into one because of transaction costs. No firm in the industry will have an incentive to
install the appliance.”).
107 Two business-messaging patents asserted against Hewlett-Packard and Adobe were
recently found invalid under Alice. YYZ, LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., Civ. No. 13-136SLR, 2015 WL 5886176, at *9 (D. Del. Oct. 8, 2015) (holding that the custom messaging
component was neither specifically claimed nor sufficiently innovative and was therefore
not patent-eligible). In a different and recent case, Home Depot was sued for infringing a
patent that lets customers choose whether to have their receipts printed or emailed to them.
Complaint at 3-4, eCeipt LLC v. Home Depot, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01672 (E.D. Tex. filed Oct.
21, 2015). Based on the argument of this paper, this claim should be rejected under Alice.
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services,108 and so on. The patent system should not grant exclusive rights in
customer-oriented or supplier-oriented business functions.
If the presumption against patentability suggested by Alice is to be extended
beyond algorithmic patenting into conceptual-functions patenting, which I
have suggested may be desirable, the next set of concepts to bring under Alice
are those involving the customer-firm or supplier-firm interface. The doctrinal
test of Alice can remain without doing any harm; it is too vague to have much
of an impact anyway on its own. If there is any practical rule that Alice should
stand for, it is for a presumption against patent eligibility for both algorithmic
software applications and for business methods that enable firms to sell,
advertise, or interact with consumers more efficiently. This subset of
conceptual functions should be left to the process of Schumpeterian
competition.109
For conceptual functions with potentially life-saving applications (such as
the driver impairment testing claimed by the Roe patent), Alice must tread
much more cautiously.110 The reason is that the additional incentive provided
by the patent system for life-saving innovations should be considered worth
preserving, and the market may be insufficient as a spur to such innovation. On
the other hand, these patents have to be assigned boundaries. Although the
principle disfavoring abstraction is well entrenched in patent law, it should be
modified to constrain patentees more effectively in this area. A doctrine
shifting the burden of proof to the patentee to show that his patent really does
have boundaries and that there are realistic methods of innovation within the
same conceptual function that are not preempted may be appropriate. Alice
may have had this effect already.

108 See Tuxis Techs., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 13-1771, 2014 WL 4382446 (D.
Del. Sept. 3, 2014) (invalidating under Alice a patent for “upselling” (i.e., suggesting pricier
options) to online consumers).
109 CASS & HYLTON, supra note 8, at 71 (“Schumpeterian creative destruction[] involves
the continual introduction of new methods that lead at times to temporary monopolies but
are eventually copied by competitors. Patents might provide an additional incentive to
develop new methods, but they will also obstruct the process of dissemination and
emulation that is core to dynamic competition.”).
110 I should be clear that this suggestion is limited to Alice as a doctrine for invalidating
patents. More traditional doctrines for invalidating patents, such as obviousness, do not have
to tread cautiously as suggested here. Traditional grounds for invalidating patents have been
in operation for many years and should not be affected by Alice. For example, the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board granted TRW Automotive US LLC’s petition for inter partes
review of a driver-assistance camera patent belonging to Magna Electronics Inc. after TRW
demonstrated a reasonable likelihood it would be able to prove the patent was anticipated by
previous technology. TRW Auto. US LLC v. Magna Elec. Inc., No. IPR2015-00923, 2015
WL 5818392 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2015). Although this is an example of a “driver safety”
innovation similar to the Roe patent discussed in the text, the difference is that the PTAB
reexamined the patent on obviousness grounds, not on the basis of Alice.
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My suggestion goes beyond life-saving innovations. Inventions occur along
a spectrum from fundamental science, to production-oriented engineering, to
methods that serve consumers or end-users efficiently. Fundamental science,
such as math and physics, has in large parts been and should be considered
ineligible for patents. Innovations that make the firm-consumer or
firm-supplier interface more efficient should also be ineligible because the
market is a sufficient spur. The production-oriented engineering level is where
patents are most effective in enhancing social welfare, and much of this
innovation is taking the form of software today. Alice is clearly applicable to
this type of innovation. Where there is a danger of granting a property right in
the abstract conceptual function, the burden should shift to the patentee to
argue that his right will not preempt future innovation within the same
conceptual function during the patent’s term.
The precise boundary of Alice is unsurprisingly impossible to delineate with
precision on the basis of general principles. Software that primarily optimizes
the consumer-firm or supplier-firm interaction, or similarly facilitates business
processes, should face a presumption of ineligibility under Alice. Potentially
life-saving technology generally should not face such a presumption. Software
in the online security area seems to fall somewhere in between these two
poles.111 Online security software may serve to protect a firm’s data from
expropriation from rivals, which is a purely business-centered function that is
likely to be spurred sufficiently by market forces without the need for patent
protection. Some online security, by contrast, may serve to protect consumers
from identity theft, which provides benefits beyond the boundaries of the
firm’s own balance sheet. Indeed, given that the primary costs of identity theft
fall on the consumer rather than the firm, a profit-oriented firm may have weak
incentives to protect the consumer from such theft. The firm may trade off
greater convenience in consumer transactions in exchange for less protection
of the consumer. Just as in the case of the Lincoln patent, the market may
provide inadequate incentives for firms to invest in innovations of this type.
However, generally, the degree to which innovation provides important
benefits to the public external to the firm’s own income or expenses suggests a
fundamental basis for identifying types of innovation that should be
approached with great care under Alice.

111 To a degree, the Federal Circuit seems to have edged toward the principles offered
here in its DDR opinion, creating an exception to Alice for software “necessarily rooted in
computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of
computer networks.” DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed.
Cir. 2014). But this limitation is too general under the theory of this paper and might extend
to online security systems that are functionally equivalent to general site security at a
factory. In any event, the DDR decision has created an area in which Alice is applied
cautiously. See, e.g., Vin Gurrieri, PTAB Rejects Bids For Computer Security Patent
Reviews, LAW360 (Sept. 28, 2015, 4:17 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/707928/ptabrejects-bids-for-computer-security-patent-reviews [https://perma.cc/Z9VL-TUWZ].
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These considerations suggest the following framework for Alice as a tool for
controlling strategic uncertainty in the patent system: (1) business method
software algorithms, such as the hedging program in Bilski, should be
presumptively invalid; (2) software designed to optimize consumer-firm or
supplier-firm interactions should be presumptively invalid; and (3) software
innovation with substantial beneficial spillovers beyond the application
market—for example, to enhance consumer safety or to preserve life—should
not be presumptively invalid, though shifting the burden of proving specific
boundaries to the patentee may be appropriate.
III. DYNAMIC UNCERTAINTY AND PATENTS
Dynamic uncertainty, recall, is the risk of a wholesale reversal or expiration
of a property right.112 This essay is on static uncertainty and patents, but there
are connections between static uncertainty and dynamic uncertainty.
The great escalation in patent litigation over the last two decades appears to
be largely attributable to the introduction of software patents.113 This escalation
has in turn increased the degree of dynamic uncertainty in the patent system.
Calls for deep patent reform, and even for the abolition of patents, have
received a more respectful hearing lately. I doubt that Boldrin and Levine’s
aggressive attack on patents, Against Intellectual Monopoly,114 would have
generated the interest that it has if the modern wave of patent litigation driven
by software had not arisen. The Economist followed its lead article criticizing
the patent system with a longer piece in the same issue that closes with
suggestions for reforming the patent system, such as reducing patent terms,
differentiating terms across types of innovation, and experimenting with
prizes.115
Luckily for patent holders, wholesale abolition is unlikely given the need for
a constitutional amendment. However, changing the patent term, or
differentiating terms according to the type of innovation (software versus
pharmaceutical) may be well within Congress’s power, as suggested in Eldred

112 See supra note 22 and accompanying text (defining and explaining dynamic
uncertainty).
113 James Bessen offers useful data on software patents and litigation. His message is that
software patents tend to get litigated, tend to have invalid claims, and are frequently picked
up by trolls. James Bessen, The Case Against Software Patents, in 9 Charts, VOX (Sept. 15,
2014, 11:08 AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/7/7/5862284/9-charts-that-show-patents-arebad-for-the-software-industry [https://perma.cc/MD9R-SBHW].
114 MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008).
115 A
Question
of
Utility,
ECONOMIST
(Aug.
8,
2015),
http://www.economist.com/node/21660559 [https://perma.cc/6CAA-NHX5] (“A top-tobottom re-examination of whether patents and other forms of intellectual-property
protection actually do their job, and even whether they deserve to exist, is long overdue.”).

2016]

PATENT UNCERTAINTY

1145

v. Ashcroft.116 Such changes can visit the same effect as wholesale abolition on
a subset of patent holders, and redistribute the rewards of the patent system
toward one set of entitlement holders and away from others.
The problem with patent reform is that any legislative effort of this sort will
generate feverish interest group lobbying. Interest group lobbying is nothing
new; the fact that it occurs was offered by the plaintiff in Eldred as a reason to
deny Congress the power to increase copyright terms, an argument the Court
promptly rejected.117 The core problem with legislative tampering is that the
most effective interest groups are likely to be large corporations that spend
heavily on lobbying. Thus, any substantial reform of the patent system will
tend to reflect the interests of large businesses, not independent inventors. The
switch from first-to-invent to first-to-file in the America Invents Act of 2011
(“AIA”) coincides with the interests of large businesses with the resources to
manage patent prosecution efficiently.118
The rent-seeking, and hence dynamic uncertainty risks, associated with
patent reform are perhaps most evident in the high-stakes patent infringement
dispute between Apple and Samsung.119 After Apple prevailed in a patent
infringement trial against Samsung, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board later
ruled that one of the patents found to be infringed in the trial was invalid in an
inter partes review process initiated by Samsung.120 The interesting and novel
feature of this event is that an administrative agency, the Patent Office,
effectively reversed a decision by a federal district court finding a particular
patent valid.121 To a student of public choice economics, or of the history of
patent law, this is a troubling sequence of events, invoking issues that had been
long buried in English patent reforms centuries ago. To offer a simplistic
analogy, it is as if the king awarded a patent, an independent judge found the
patent to have been infringed, and the infringer went directly to the king and
asked him to revoke the patent. The obvious danger in this simple story is that
the infringer might be a relative, friend, or patron of the king, and therefore in
116

537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (“[T]he Copyright Clause empowers Congress to determine
the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve the ends of
the Clause.”).
117 See id. at 203 (“The [Copyright Term Extension Act] reflects judgments of a kind
Congress typically makes, judgments we cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature’s
domain.”).
118 See, e.g., Andrew L. Sharp, Note, Misguided Patent Reform: The Questionable
Constitutionality of First-to-File, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1227, 1236-37 (2013) (explaining the
benefits of first-to-invent patent systems for smaller entities over large corporations).
119 See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
120 Derek F. Dahlgren, The Saga Continues: Apple v. Samsung, Next Stop Supreme
Court, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/09/29/apple-vsamsung-next-stop-supreme-court/id=62065/ [https://perma.cc/2FAD-SPY9] (“The Patent
Office recently issued a non-final rejection in an ex parte reexamination finding that Apple’s
U.S. Patent No. D618,677 is unpatentable on multiple grounds.”).
121 See id.
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a position to persuade the king to take a far less objective view of the dispute
than that taken by the judge. The English courts appeared to have solved this
problem in 1603 in Darcy v. Allen (The Case of Monopolies),122 divorcing the
king’s preferences from the standard by which judges would enforce patents
against infringers.123
The patent review processes of the AIA partially resuscitate the problem of
executive intermeddling in the enforcement of patents. Obviously, the federal
Patent Office is quite a bit removed from the simple-minded king in my
example, but it is part of the executive branch, not part of the judicial branch
which for many years has had the final word on the validity of patents. The
great difference between the executive and the judicial branches is that the
agents of the latter are relatively distant from the lobbying pressures imposed
on and originating from the executive branch.124 To permit an executive
agency to reverse a decision by a federal judge is to take a step in the direction
of a politicized patent system, which opens the door to all of the uncertainties
associated with executive power intervention in the patent enforcement
process.
122

(1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.).
Id. at 1266 (“And our lord the King . . . expressly commands, that no suitor presume
to move him to grant any [patents].”).
124 To be sure, administrative patent judges are considered to be independent of the
federal Patent Office Director, but some litigants have suggested that this purported
independence is not nearly as complete as that of a federal judge. For example, hedge fund
manager Kyle Bass claimed that federal Patent Office Director Michelle Lee had directed
the administrative patent judges not to institute any inter partes reviews of petitions he had
filed with the agency. See Susan Decker, Bass Vows to Keep Fighting U.S. Drug Patents
(Sept.
3,
2015,
6:09
PM),
After
Setbacks,
BLOOMBERGBUSINESS
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-03/bass-vows-to-keep-fighting-u-s-drugpatents-after-setbacks [https://perma.cc/WD9Z-NGF8]. Moreover, administrative patent
judges do not have Article III tenure as do federal judges, and the Patent Office Director
may designate the panels that decide cases in the manner consistent with his or her
preferences. See John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 77
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 904, 908 (2009) (“It is true that the Director of the PTO retains a
substantial supervisory role over the BPAI and can, for example, use his power to designate
BPAI panels that he ‘hopes will render the decision he desires, even upon rehearing.’”);
Masur, supra note 42, at 496 n.106. Administrative patent judges do not have the same
protections as Article I administrative law judges because the legislature does not directly
create their positions. See, e.g., Duffy, supra, at 904-05 (“Under 35 U.S.C. § 6,
administrative patent judges of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (‘BPAI’) are
appointed by the Director of the Patent and Trademark Office (‘PTO’). That method of
appointment is almost certainly unconstitutional, and the administrative patent judges
serving under such appointments are likely to be viewed by the courts as having no
constitutionally valid governmental authority.” (internal citations omitted)). In addition,
administrative patent judges undergo a two-year probationary period. See Job
Announcement No. PTAB-2015-0023 (Administrative Patent Judge), USAJOBS,
https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/PrintPreview/393260300 [https://perma.cc/J8CD-6TTM].
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Even proposals to pass legislation regulating patent trolls raise the risk of
inter-group wealth transfers of a predictable nature. While there have been
notable examples of abuse by patent trolls,125 the troll also offers independent
inventors and small businesses an affordable way of enforcing their patent
rights, and by doing so helps to support innovation incentives. As I noted
earlier, the troll, as a licensor of patents, ordinarily stands willing to license to
all businesses rather than favor one business over another. Moreover, in the
current patent litigation environment, trolls, as non-practicing entities, are
relatively immune from threats of counterclaims typically used as a defensive
mechanism by firms experienced in patent litigation. However, trolls are
unnecessary to enforce patents from the perspective of large firms with inhouse legal departments, and their presence only makes it more difficult to
deter infringement claims brought by smaller firms. Hence, a statute that taxed
or abolished trolls would benefit large firms at the expense of small ones.
The courts already have at their hands virtually all of the tools necessary to
regulate patent trolls. The Supreme Court’s decision in Octane Fitness, LLC v.
Icon Health & Fitness, Inc.,126 making it easier for victims of abusive patent
infringement litigation claims to collect attorneys’ fees, may be a sufficient
regulatory mechanism for trolls.127 A troll who recognizes that he may be
forced to pay the attorneys’ fees of a party he sues for infringement will tend to
bring only the strongest infringement claims.128
The optimal program for addressing uncertainty in the patent system is
through the common law process of making marginal changes in the scope of
patent rights through judicial decision-making. Many of these marginal
changes can be applied with surgical accuracy to fix a particular problem
without creating new ones. For example, the Court’s decision in Octane
Fitness removes much of the need for any special statute from Congress
enacting a “loser pays” rule for allocating attorney expenses in patent
infringement litigation initiated by patent trolls. If Congress does eventually
pass a statute adopting a “loser pays” rule for patent trolls, it is likely to
include other provisions that tilt the playing field in favor of businesses that
125

See e.g., Susan Decker, Notorious ‘Patent Troll’ MPHJ Will Ease Tactics: FTC,
BLOOMBERGBUSINESS
(Nov.
6,
2014,
5:31
PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-06/notorious-patent-troll-mphj-will-easetactics-ftc [https://perma.cc/SU6E-B55T] (“MPHJ Technology Investments LLC will stop
making deceptive claims. MPHJ, its sole owner Jay Mac Rust of Waco, Texas, and its law
firm Farney Daniels had sent letters to thousands of small companies warning they face
lawsuits unless they pay to license MPHJ patents, according to the FTC.”).
126 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
127 Id. at 1756 (holding that the court may award attorneys’ fees where the case “stands
out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position” or
where the case was litigated in an “unreasonable manner”).
128 On the filing incentives of fee shifting, see Hylton, supra note 6, at 444
(demonstrating that a plaintiff will only bring a case when his expected award exceeds the
expected cost).
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can afford to hire lobbyists. Indeed, as I have already suggested, any statute
regulating patent trolls is likely to effect a wealth transfer from small business
and independent inventors toward established technology businesses. Such
wealth transfers work to reduce innovation among the numerous atomistic
sources the patent system was designed to encourage and concentrate
innovation incentives in corporations, with a likely reduction in the overall rate
of innovation and a shift in the nature of innovation.
CONCLUSION
Courts should adopt doctrinal rules that reduce strategic uncertainty in
patent law. This may seem to be an obvious statement, but it excludes some
alternatives. First, inherent uncertainty, due to ambiguity in the statement of a
rule, does not need to be a focus of reform, because the common law process is
necessarily uncertain at an early stage of analysis of a particular class of legal
claims. Second, the appearance of uncertainty that arises from changes in the
composition of patent disputes should be understood for what it is. Third,
uncertainty that results from strategic behavior of litigants—what I have called
strategic uncertainty here—is the only source of uncertainty that should be
addressed by reform-minded courts; and it should be addressed by the courts
rather than the legislature, or hived off into the administrative process.

